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Authority is best defined as a relation that exists between individuals. A relation of 
authority exists when one individual, prompted by his or her circumstances, does as 
indicated by another individual what he or she would not do in the absence of such 
indication. This I will refer to as the authority relation. The legitimacy of an authority 
relation is what keeps the relationship from breaking down, and is the answer to the 
question: why does the one who follows do as indicated by the one who rules? 
The authority relation is perhaps as old as civilization itself. The very moment in 
which individuals began living in communities and tried to organize the tasks required 
for their survival gave birth to the need to coordinate the actions of many, to delegate 
among the members of the group, and to trust that this coordination and delegation 
process would occur. Any resolution of such demands, whether successful or not, 
involved the constant creation and destruction of authority relations. In this context, a 
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social theory of authority is a collection of principles aimed at understanding: (a) how the 
circumstances of living in a community affect the authority relations that exist among its 
members, and (b) how the evolution of the community itself is affected by this web of 
authority relations. 
1. Origins 
The intrinsic importance of the matter of understanding authority relations as they arise in 
society has led to a large list of authors who have written on the subject (an excellent 
survey of the early meaning of authority can be found in Arendt 1958). Plato, for 
example, wrote that only "those who can apprehend the eternal and unchanging [aspects 
of reality]" (Plato 1945, p. 190) ought to occupy positions of authority. There are two 
reasons why Plato wanted this tall order to be met. First, he thought that only those who 
are enlightened in this way could understand that which is ultimately Good, and for Plato 
the exercise of authority is only legitimate to the extent that one brings society closer to 
that Good. The second reason has to do with the survival of the seekers for wisdom 
themselves. Plato argued that whenever those uninterested about matters of truth and 
wisdom are the rulers in a community, the conditions for the attainment of wisdom 
disappear, as community life is organized in a way that leads the seekers of wisdom to 
become corrupted and interested in other matters. 
Aristotle makes no reference to a Good order, the understanding of which 
qualifies one to rule in a community. He notices simply that we all have natur l talents 
and dispositions towards the different tasks. One of them is that of ruling wisely and 
effectively. Those in possession of such disposition ought to be the ones who rule. The 
3 
act of ranking those in capacity to rule according to their abilities and scope leads to a 
hierarchical organization, with the orders flowing from the top. 
Notice that these accounts of the authority relation are more postulates of how the 
relation ought to be rather than descriptions of what Plato and Aristotle witnessed 
happening in their times. Notice also that in both accounts the authority that an individual 
has over another is legitimized in a manner that is external to the individuals: there is 
either the sphere of the Good, or the Natural (or the sphere of God as in the case of the 
early Christian writers) to mediate between the ruler and the ruled. Indeed, in these 
accounts both ruler and ruled have minimal importance: it is the solidity of the external 
link between them what matters. As an explanation of how the authority relation operates 
this seems unsatisfactory because it does not provide a causal link through which the 
process of legitimization takes place. It is Machiavelli who first attempts to describe in a 
pragmatic manner how the external links stressed by the Greek play a role in shaping 
social organization. 
Machiavelli begins with a simple observation: that it is not platonic or Christian 
virtue but the seizure of opportunity that which chiefly leads to a position of authority. 
An accurate reading of the times, Machiavelli would say, a carefully plotted plan, and the 
unapologetic use of force against the correctly identified enemy, are all that is necessary 
to position oneself as a ruler. And once in that position it is of capital importance, 
according to Machiavelli, to establish appropriate foundations for one's ruling. 
Machiavelli presents his ideas through the analysis of an example that continues to be of 
importance today: the establishment of the Roman republic. As Arendt artfully indicates, 
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Machiavelli "saw that the whole of Roman history and mentality depended upon the 
experience of foundation, and he believed it should be possible to repeat the Roman 
experience" (Arendt 1958, p. 108). What Machiavelli understood was that there is not 
one single (natural or metaphysical) foundational cosmogony against which all authority 
relations should be measured, but that these cosmogonies can be crafted to support the 
authority of a particular individual or group. Once in place, a foundational cosmogony 
that supports the ruler's actions can be tremendously useful for the ruler, for no individual 
in a community whose way of thinking is deeply rooted in it could be in a position to 
challenge the ruler's authority; not even conceptually. For anyone who sees this clearly it 
becomes no longer possible to understand the legitimacy of an authority relation as 
externally given. This is indeed what happened during the twentieth century as a deep 
crisis of authority bred in the midst of serious skepticism regarding the validity of the 
traditionally accepted cosmogonies. 
Max Weber scrutinized the authority relation more as a scholar than as a political 
strategist. Weber distinguished between forms of authority according to the type of 
legitimacy underlying each form. According to Weber, "the validity of the claims to 
legitimacy may be based on: (1) Rational grounds -resting on a belief in the legality of 
enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules (…) (2) 
Traditional grounds -resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial 
traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (…) or (3) 
Charismatic grounds -resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or 
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exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order 
revealed or ordained by [the person]" (Weber 1978 pp. 213-214). 
The importance of Weber’s analysis does not rely on his particular classification 
of forms of authority but on his emphasis on the study of the legitimacy underlying an 
authority relation “within the framework of the concrete actor and his actions” (Easton 
1958, p. 174). This perspective is crucial because it is one from which one can begin to 
understand the motivations underlying a particular design of an authority relation: one is 
invited by Weber to study the authority relation by focusing on the motivations, desires 
and circumstances of those who rule. In a sense, Weber’s work picks up the analysis of 
authority right at the point where Machiavelli left it. 
2. Contemporary Uses 
There is wide disagreement among contemporary scholars as to how the authority 
relation should be understood. Many even abstain from venturing operational definitions 
of authority such as the one presented at the beginning of this article (An example of this 
is Robert Peabody's article on authority in the International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences 1968). Disagreement stems from many sources. Consider the following 
examples: Arendt believes that the authority relation is an implausible one in a modern 
society, due to the absence of a unique and uncontradicted cosmogony upon which the 
legitimacy of a ruler may be founded on. William Connolly agrees with Arendt in that a 
modern understanding of authority is problematic, but argues that the web of conventions 
regarding how social customs are interpreted and implemented is the modern equivalent 
of the pre-modern cosmogony. Writers like Nancy Rosenblum, in turn, argue that women 
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and men understand relations of authority in very different ways. Rosenblum, following 
Carol Gilligan, argues that "for women, the typical moral ideal is cooperation and 
interdependence rather than fulfillment of a formal obligation." The implication is that 
"authority, rules, and procedures will be less imperative for [women] than empathy or the 
impulse to be responsible for maintaining concrete personal relations" (Rosenblum 1987, 
pp.116-117). Lucian Pye has said something of that sort regarding the differences 
between notions of authority that occur due to cultural differences between countries (Pye 
1985). Stanley Milgram and others have studied extensively how deeply rooted the 
practice of obedience to authority figures is in the context of small groups (a survey of 
this literature can be found in Hare 1976). As the examples show, one is left not with one 
but with multiple perspectives for the analysis of the authority relation. 
2. 1 The Multiple Perspectives View 
Rather than viewing the multiplicity of perspectives as a nuisance Stephen Lukes 
organized them in such a way that they, collectively, conform an insightful view for the 
study of authority. 
The multiple perspectives view cuts through an old problem in the analysis of 
authority: that of whether one can ask analytical questions about authority in a relativized 
manner, that is, independently of normative issues regarding the legitimacy of authority. 
For some, “the nonrelativized notion is primary and is presupposed by the relativized 
notion. On this view, to analyze authority is to analyze legitimate or justified authority” 
(Lukes 1987, p. 60). For others, the relativized analysis is possible; one thing is to 
discover and scrutinize instances of obedience and a different one to assess their validity 
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and desirability. From the standpoint of the multiple perspectives view, however, in 
identifying relations of authority one always operates at the interpreted level of the social 
interaction. Therefore, according to Lukes, "every way of identifying authority is relative 
to one or more perspectives, (…) there is no objective, in the sense of perspective neutral, 
way of doing so" (Lukes 1987, p. 60). The multiple perspectives view provides a unified 
foundation for both the analytical and the normative inquiries. 
The multiple perspectives that arise in the present times with regard to the 
analysis of authority can be associated with the different degrees of solidity attributed to 
social composites such as culture, language, social groups, and the individual itself. The 
previous section presented the view that it was with respect to a solid cosmogony that the 
pre-modern authority relation could be understood. With this perspective gone, Weber's 
analysis relies on the solidity of the internal world of those who occupy the position of 
the ruler in the relation. But the perspective of the ruler is one of many that can be held. 
Lukes identified many other relevant perspectives: that of the one who obeys, that of an 
external observer, that which describes the community as either formally or informally 
constituted, that describing the collective wisdom of the community, and the objective 
perspective (if it can exist at all) "from which all other perspectives may be assessed" 
(Lukes 1987, p. 62). In a world devoid of a unique cosmogony, they may all not be the 
same. 
According to Lukes, the multiple perspectives view shows the need of going 
beyond the classical Weberian analysis of the authority relation. A command, according 
to Weber is obeyed “either through empathy or through inspiration or through persuasion 
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by rational argument" (Weber, quoted by Lukes 1987, p. 63). But Weber never asks the 
question: what legitimizes the command in the eyes of the one who obeys? This failure to 
ask the question is unproblematic when the ruler's perspective happens to be shared by 
rulers and followers alike. While this is a tenable point of view on many occasions, this 
identification of the perspectives between rulers and followers is anything but solid, as 
the modern study of rebellion shows. Weber’s analysis is therefore deemed incomplete 
due to his failure to see anything but the perspective of the “ruling class” as important in 
understanding authority relations. 
Richard Friedman offers an approach that includes the perspectives of both the 
ruler and the follower. According to Friedman, for there it to be a relation of authority 
one needs to understand the common ground that exists between a ruler and a follower 
because it is this common ground that which enables the obedience. In Lukes' words: 
"Legitimation claimed and the according of legitimacy coincide in a shared recognition 
of entitlement" (Lukes 1987, p. 65). Lukes sees two problems with this point of view. 
First, one can think of cases where authority seems to go unrecognized by either the ruler 
or the follower. Richard Flathman provides a solution to this problem. He suggests that 
the authority relation belongs to a wider web of practices and beliefs that provide 
meaning to all relations in a community, even unwittingly (See Lukes 1987, pp. 66-67). 
The second problem, according to Lukes, is that Friedman gives no indication as to how 
to distinguish between the common grounds that enable obedience from the ones that do 
not. In other words, it still leaves unanswered the critical question regarding obedience: 
what legitimizes the command in the eyes of the one who obeys? 
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When is, then, authority legitimate? Joseph Raz advances the dependence thesis, 
namely that “all authoritative directives should be based, in the main, on reasons which 
already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their 
action in the circumstances covered by the directive” (Raz 1990, p 125). In other words, 
authority is legitimate when there are reasons, from the follower's perspective, that 
already compel the follower to obey. Obedience is then investigated from the point of 
view of the motivations, desires and circumstances of both the ruler and the follower. 
2.2 The Game Theoretic View 
The point of view brought forth by Raz is an advance both on Weber, as it includes the 
perspective of the follower as well as that of the leader, and on Friedman, as it displays 
all the elements necessary to investigate the question of legitimacy. To see this it is 
convenient to adopt the terminology and analysis of game theory (for an introduction to 
this mode of social analysis see Dixit and Skeath 1999). In a basic game theoretic 
formulation of an interaction between individuals one first begins by identifying the 
choices available to each, and then by delineating how the situations (that is, the 
motivations, desires and circumstances) of all those involved affect each individual's 
choice. The goal is to be able to understand the choices of all individuals in the 
interaction by focusing on what beliefs are reasonable for each individual to hold about 
what will unfold in the interaction given each individual's situation. The beliefs held by 
the individuals in an interaction are in equilibrium when they are not contradicted by the 
choices that they justify given each individual's situation. While controversial, the game 
theoretic mode of analysis is gaining recognition as a valid and powerful mode of social 
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analysis. See Bates et. al. (1998) and Binmore (1994, 1998) for examples of game 
theoretic applications to the fields of political science and political philosophy, 
respectively. For these authors, social composites such as language, culture and social 
groups are as solid as the equilibrium beliefs underlying the individual choices that, 
collectively, support the social composite in question. 
The perspective given by beliefs that are in equilibrium is one with respect to 
which one can evaluate the plausibility and legitimacy of an authority relation: an 
individual can be in a position of authority with respect to another individual to the extent 
that there are equilibrium beliefs that support choices that an analyst of the relation 
denotes as "ruling" for the ruler and "following" for the follower (Zambrano 1999). 
Hobbes understood this well when he wrote: "The power of the mighty hath no 
foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people" (Hobbes, quoted by Binmore 
1998, p. 457). Equilibrium beliefs: (a) are at the interpreted level of the social interaction 
(Lukes); (b) serve as the common ground that sustains an authority relation (Friedman); 
(c) are determined with respect to both the ruler and the follower’s situation (Raz); and 
(d) are part of the web of practices and beliefs that provide meaning to all relations in a 
community (Flathman). 
Now, the problem is: “how are we to ascertain what the reasons that apply to 
authority’s subjects are and in what ‘success’ in acting on them or guiding us to them 
consists?” (Lukes 1987, p. 69) In other words, can we recover equilibrium beliefs that 
legitimize the authority relation by looking at the situation of the individuals involved? 
The answer seems to be: in general one could recover many such equilibria, not simply 
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one. How is one to decide on which leads to the right justification? According to Lukes, 
the answer seems to be: there is no right justification. Different justifications suggest 
themselves depending on the perspective that one uses to interpret the authority relation. 
There is no single social theory of authority; there are only multiple perspectives that are 
plausible and valid to the extent to which they are equilibrium beliefs that legitimize the 
authority relations in a community. In Michel Foucault's words: "Each society has its 
regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it 
accepts and makes function as true" (Foucault 1980, p. 131). 
The game theoretic analysis of authority helps us understand the kinds of belief 
systems that could support the authority of one individual over another. But there where 
its strength lies, lies its weakness as well. As mentioned before, in this mode of analysis 
one evaluates the plausibility of a belief system by checking its consistency with the 
choices that it justifies given each individual's situation. There are two problems with 
this: first, the analysis is silent as to how beliefs configure themselves in equilibrium 
proportions. One is at the mercy of history, as it perhaps should be, to teach us about how 
different institutions of authority have emerged in different cultures. Part of the narrative 
of the evolution of authority can be thought as occurring spontaneously (Aristotle), but 
part of its narrative can only be understood with respect to a design functional to some 
(Machiavelli). Game theory provides only a language in which the story can be 
parsimoniously told and formally analyzed. 
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2.3 The Cognitive Science View 
The second problem is more severe. Just as recent social science challenges the solidity 
of social composites such as truth, language, culture, social groups and authority (as seen 
in this article), recent research on cognitive science challenges the solidity of the 
individual itself. As Francisco Varela puts it: "What we call 'I' can be analyzed as arising 
out of our recursive linguistic abilities and their unique capacity for self-description and 
narration (…) the selfless 'I' is a bridge between the corporeal body which is common to 
all beings with nervous systems and the social dynamics in which humans live. My 'I' is 
neither private nor public alone, but partakes of both. And so do the kinds of narratives 
that go with it, such as values, habits and preferences" (Varela 1999, p. 62). This poses 
problems for a game theoretic understanding of authority since this mode of analysis is 
grounded on the solidity of the individual and his or her cognitive situation. 
Notice, however, the similarities between both approaches: the self, just as the 
other social composites, arises at the interpreted level of a collection of behaviors 
centered on a single body and its social history. Varela himself points out this similarity: 
"whenever we find regularities such as laws or social roles and conceive of them as 
externally given, we have succumbed to the fallacy of attributing substantial identity to 
what [, like the self,] is really an emergent property of a complex, distributed process 
mediated by social interactions" (Varela 1999, p.62). For Varela, the self, and the 
authority of a self over another self are notions that give meaning to each other through 
their arising in the context of a collection of bodies and social histories in a way that 
preserves the identity of the selves and of the relations between them. In other words, 
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they are equilibrium beliefs of a larger game, with respect to which the actions of all can 
be legitimized; and those actions, in turn, reinforce the apparent solidity of the authority 
link, and of the individuals themselves. 
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